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A simple modification of recent growth models eliminiates  the
implausible implicationi  that growth rates should be equalized in
the presence of free international capital mobility and is consis-
tent with evidence that points to low rates of savings in low
income countries.
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Enrico  Mattei  Foundation  in  Milan.I.  INTRODUCTION
During  the  past  fIve  years  growth  theory  has  become  one  of
tb -- mot  active  areas  of  research  ln economics.  This  paper
evaluates  the  progress  made  by  this  recent  literature  in.
explaining  differences  In  rates  of  growth  across  countries  ardL
across  historical  epochs.  This  evaluation  points  to  an.  important
shortcoAing  of  new growth theories: they can  only  explain
cross-country  differences  In rates of growth by assuming the
absence  of lnternational  capital  markets.
Heat recent  models  Imply  that low rates  of growth  are the
result of low real rates of return to investment  by private
agents. If  this  Is  the  case  the  development  problem  has a simple
solution:  allow  stagnant  countries  to Invest  in the developed
world where the real rate of return Is high.  This simple,
costless  policy  would  lead  real  per capita  consumption  and real
per capita  GN? to grow at the  same rate In the developed  and
underdeveloped  worlds.
Growth models point to this implausible  solution to the
development  problem  because  of  their  specification of
lntertemporal  preferences. The standard  lntertemporal  utility
function  implies  that  the  optimal  savings  rate is identical  for
two countries  which have the same real rate of interest  but
different  income  levels. This  property  leads  to the  prediction
that  an underdeveloped  country  which  can Invest  in the US will
choose  the  same rate of savings,  and hence  will expand its  GNP
(but  not Its  GDP)  at the  same  rate  as the  US.
This  paper  studies a  simple  extension of  standard
preferences  In which  momentary  utility  has a  Stone-Geary  form:
utility  is derived  from the  amount  of consumption  that is above
the level  of subsistence  consumption.  With this  modification  it
Is possible  to generate  different  rates  of growth  even  in the
presence of  perfect international  capital markets.  These
preferences  also imply  that  the  rate  of savings  should  be lower
in  poorer  countries  as seems  to  be the  case  in the  data.The paper Is organized  as follows.  Section II summarizes
different  theories  that  attempt  to  explain  the  observed  diversity
In growth rates.  Section III discusses empirical evidenne
related to these theories.  This section also examines Lhe
relation  between  the  implications  of various  models  for the real
rate  of return  and  an indicator  often  used  to  evaluate  the  growth
performance  of LWC's:  the Incremental  Output Capital Ratio
(ICOR). Section  IV  discusses  the  role  of international  capital
markets. Section  V studies  the  properties  of the  rate  of growth
when preferences  have a Stone-Geary  form -md presents  evidence
that accords  with those  properties. Section  VI provides  some
conclusions.
II. WHY  DO  GROWTH  RATES  DIFFER?
This  section  summarizes  some  of the  theories  that  have been
advanced  to  explain  cross-country  differences  In  rates  of  growth.
All the theories  described  can be seen as extensions  of the
neoclassical  growth model of Solow  (1956), Cass  (1965) and
Koopmans (1965).  1  We  first review the  channels by  which
government  policy  can  affect  rates  of growth. We then  describe
three  models that predict  the presence  of trends in rates of
growth:  the  neoclassical  growth  model,  and the  models  proposed
by  Romer (1986)  and  Jones  and  Manuelli  (1990). The interactions
between  trade  and  growth  are  examined  next.  Finally,  we discuss
economies wtth poverty traps.
IThis  emphasis  on models  that  extend  the  neoclassical  framework
to explain  differences  in rates  of growth  means that a  large
number  of interesting  papers  associated  with the new literature
will  not  be  reviewed  in  this  section. Examples  include  Greenwood
and Jovanovic  (1990),  Bencivenga  and Smith (1988),  Marcet and
tarimon  (1991:,  and  Levine  (1991)  on financial  Intermediation  and
growth:  Stokey  41988,1991)  on the  process  of Introduction  of new
goods; Aghion and Howitt (1990)  and Jovanovic  and MacDonald
(1990)  on inncvation;  Krugman  (1991)  on economic  geography;  and
Schmitz  (1989)  on the  interaction  between  Industrial  organization
issues  and  growth.
2In describing  these  theories  we  always  impose  -ae  symmetry
hetween  the  economy  under  study  and  the  rest  of the  world  to rule
out  explanations  of  differences  in  growth  rates  that  are  based
solely  on  the  existence  of  cross-country  differences  In
preferences  or  in  technology.  This  type  of  symetry  is
conventional  in  modern  macroeconomic  theory  but  Is  foreign  to  the
develcpment  economics  tradition.  Most of the models used In
development  economics  emphasize  the  unique  features  of
underdeveloped  countries.
II.1  GOVENMENT POLICY
Before  discussing  how  government  policy  can affect  economic
growth  It Is  useful  to lay  out  a simple  linear  growth  model  with
government.  This model can be  obtained by  aggregating
physical and human capital Into a composite  good In a  Lucas
(1988)-Uzawa  (1965)  economy  that  follows  a steady  state  path,  has
no externalities,  and has Identical  technologies  In the output
and  human  capital  accumulation  sectors. 2
While the linear  model Is very useful  as an expositional
device  and as a guide  to back-of-the-envelope  calculations,  it
has  some  drawoacks. As Romer  (1990a)  has  emphasized,  this  model
(as all others  of the Lucas-Uzawa  variety)  cannot  explain  why
private  firms invest  in R&D.  The linear  model also tends to
exaggerate  the  effects  of  certain  public  policies  by ignoring  the
role  of population  size  and  assuming  that the  ratio  of physical
to human capital is fixed.  But the qualitative  effects of
government  policy  described  below  can  be built  into  virtually  any
endogenous  growth  model.
Jones  and  Manuelli (1990) and  Rebelo  (1991) discuss  the
properties  of the linear  model  and  of related  models.  King and
Rebelo (1990)  compare  the  effects  of taxation  on growth  and on
welfare  in the linear  model  and In a version  of the  Lucas-Uzawa
mcdel  in  which  there  are  no externalities  and  physical  capital  is
used  in the  production  of  human  capital.
3&-Llnear  Growth  Modol
In  this  economy population  grows  at  the  exogenous  gross  rate-
r-  and  is  composed  by  Identical  agents.  To  simplify  the.
expositlon  all  variables  are  expressed  in  per  capita  terms.  V'-
will  represent  the  gross  growth  rate  of  variable  X by  7x-
There  is  a  single  type  of  capital  good  (Zt)  which  Is  a
composite  of  physical  and  human  capital.  Production  is  a linear
function  of  te.h  stock  of  capital  and  can  be  used  In  consumption
(Ct)  or  investment  (It)
t  t
Yt =AZt(
Yt  It  +Ct'  (2)
The  law  of motion  for  the  per  capita  stock  of capital  is the
standard  one:
7NZt1  =It  t  (1-8)Zto  (3)
where  8  represents  the  rate  of depreciation.  Since  Zt  Is  *
composite  good that  includes  human  capital  It Is natural  to
assume  that  Investment  Is  irreversible,  I  t  0.
To  describe  the  operation  of  this  economy  it  is  convenient
to think  of a decentralization  scheme  in  which  there  are two
types  of markets: spot  factor  markets  and  one-period  credit
markets.
Households  own  the  capital  stock  which  they  rent  to firms
for  Rt. Profit  (or  value)  maximization  by  firms  and  equilibrium
In  the  factor  market  Implies  that  the  rental  price  of capital
must  be equal  to the  marginal  product  of capital: Rt =  A.
Equilibrium  In  the  credit  market  requires  that  the  real  rate  of
interest  must  be  equal  to  rt  =  Rt  -6 - A  - a.
The  growth  rate  of  this  economy  is  determined  by  the  savings
4decision  of private  agents.  Defining  the  savings rate as the
fraction  of Investment  on net income. st 1 (It-aZ/(Yt-6Zt),  we
can  express  the  rate  of  growth  of  output  as:
=y (s  r  + I)/7N  (4)
Equation  '4)  shows  that  changes  in  r  have  a direct  effect  on
the growth rate and an Indirect  effect, associated  with  the
response  of the savings  rate to changes in  the  real  rate  of
return.  To explore  this indirect  effect  we need to make the
savings  rate  endogenous.  This  will also clarify  the  effects  of
population  growth  on the rate  of growth  of per capita  output.
Thus we  assume that each agent in  the economy has  perfect
foresight  and  makes  his savings  decision  so as to maximize  his
llfe-time  utility:
t-J =  v  (3  )t u(Ct  (5
t=0
The momentary  utility function u(Ct) Is  assumed to  be
Isoelastic  so  as to  be  consistent  with steady  state  growth: 3
t u(Ct)  =  _  *>  (6)
These  preferences  Imply  that  households  expand  their  consumption
at a constant  rate  whenever  the  real  Interest  rate  Is  constant.
The parameter  iq represents  the nature  of the links  between
present  and future  generations. It is standard  to assume that
current generations  care for  the  total utility of  future
generations,  which corresponds  to the case of ii=1  (e.g. Lucas
(1988)). However,  Barro  and  Becker  (1989)  choose  O<1<1 in their
analysis  of endogenous  fertility  decisions.  As will be clear
3The  choice  of preferences  and  production  technologies  consistent
with  steady  state  growth  is  usually  justified  by appealing  to the
Kaldor (1961)  stylized  facts of eronomic  growth.  See Romer
(1989)  for  a discussion  of these  facts.
Sbelow,  in  equation  (6),  the value of  7n  is crucial to determtne
the  Influence of  exogenous population growth  on  the  rate  of
expansion of the  economy.
In order to ensure that llfe-tlme-utility  is  filnite,  so that
(3) can be used to rank all feasible growth paths, we  need to
impose that:
t$7w) ((A  +  (161W}<  t.  (7)
N 
Finite utility conditions analogous  to this one will be assumed
to hold  in all other models that we  describe but  will  not be
stated  explicitly.
The optimal rate of consumption  growth from the standpoint
of households is:
V=  ~STN  (l+r)]  (8)
This implies  that the optimal  savings  rate Is:
s =  1t3  (l.r)1W  /a/r  (9)
N
It is  well known that the response  of savings to changes In
the real interest  rate  depends on the relative  strength of income
and substitution  effects.  But the usual property that with o-1
these two  effects cancel each other and ds/dr - 0, while ds/dr  >
O with o<l and ds/dr <  0 with  ->I,  does not apply here.  In order
for these relations to hold we would have to define the savings
rate  as:  se =  UI  +  (1-8)Z /  *Yt  +  Zt(1-6)1.  The savings rate s
will generally respond to  changes In r even In the case of c-1.
The growth rate of output can be obtained by replacing s  in
equation (8).  Alternatively,  since  output grows at the same rate
as consuzm;tion,  Y  can  be obtained  by replacing  r In equation
(8).  One notable property of  this economy Is that It has  no
transitional  dynamics, It always  grows at the following rate:
67y  is{ 7Nhl [A  +  (1-6)1)  (10)
N
This equation shows that an increase  in the real rate  of Interest
r - A - 8 always leads to an incroase in the rate of growth.
Expression  (10) ignores the possibility of  the  non-negativity
constraint on Investment  being bincing.  When this Is the case
investment is zero and the  gross  rate of growth is  (1-8)/.
Equation  (10)  also  shows  that  population  growth  has  a
negative  impact on  the rate  of  growth  of  per  capita  output
whenever q<I.  When q  - 1 the positive influence of population
growta on savings 'see equation (9)) t'a  exactly offset by  the
fact that a higher rate of population growth requires a higher
savings rate to maintain a given rate of growth of per  capita
output (see  equation (4)).
This economy  illustrates two features that are  shared by
virtually all endogenous growth models.  The first  Is that the
real rate of return does not decline toward zero as the capital
stock increases.  It is this property that  makes sustained growth
feasible.  The second feaLure is the link between the real rate
of return to investment  and the rate of growth.  If this rate of
return Is low the rate of capital accumulation declines and  so
does the rate of growth.
In a world composed of economies such as this one the rate
of economic expansion is uniform across countries.  Equation (8)
shows  that  to  generate  different  growth  rates  we  need
cross-country  differences ln  the real rate of return.  A natural
candidate as a source for these  differences is public policy.  We
explore this Idea below but It is worthwhile noting that in this
model the optimal public policy is generally independent of  the
country's income level.4  Thus, If all governments maximized the
4This  is  partly  a  result  of  the  absence  of  transitional
dynamics in the linear model.  Chamley (1986) shows that In the
neoclassical  model  the  optimal  capital  tax  rate  is  positivo
during the transition  period but zero in the steady state.  Thus
the  neoclassical model Implies  that countries at different levels
7welfare  of the  representative  agent  all countries  would  grow  at
the  same  rate.5
Ih£  gffXtl  gL Taxation
Suppose  that  In the  economy  described  above the  government
introduces  a proportional  income  tax with rate T.  The  revenue
from this  tax is  used  to finance  public  consumption.  Gt =  nAZ  t
For now we will assume  that  public  consumption  does not affect
production  and  enters  in  utility  in  a separable  manner:
U =  z  (o)t  (u(CM  )  +  O(Gt)3  (i1)
t3o
The function  0(.),  which  represents  the  utility  associated  with
government  expenditures,  Is  assumed  to  be bounded.
With  the Introduction  of Income taxation the after-tax
rental price of capital Is R  =  A(1-r) while  the after-tax
equilibrium real interest  rate Is rt =  A(1-r) - 6.  Since  the
growth  rate of the  economy  continues  to be given by (8). it Is
clear that income  taxation  reduces  the rate of &rowth.  Given
that  tax systems  are  different  across  countries  this  channel  of
influence of  economic policy on  the  rate  of  growth  can
potentially  be  empirically  Important.
Not  all  forms  of taxation  have,  however,  growth  effects. A
consumption  tax  is,  in  this  economy,  equivalent  to  a lump  sum  tax
and  has  no effects  on  growth. In  contrast,  an investment  tax  has
of Income  should  choose  different  tax systems.  Lucas (1991),
Yuen (1990)  and  Jones,  Manuelli  and  Rossi  (1990)  discuss  similar
results  for  endc~,;ous  growth  models.
iAn  nteresting  new  line of work has begun to explore the
co-nection  between  endogenous  policy  and economic  growth.  This
Involves  modeling  public  pc Icy  as the outcome  of a political
process,  Instead  of  consider,.g  the  two  polar  cases  of  exogenous
policy  and  optimal  policy  from  the  standpoint  of  an
infinitely-lived  benevolent  government.  See  Tabellini and
Persson  (1990)  and  Cohen  and  Michel  (1991).
8growth  effects  that  are  similar-  to those  of an income-  tax:  it
reduces  the real rate of interest  and the rate of growth (see
Rebelo  (1991)).
There are other policies  that have the same effects as
incomw  taxation  on  the  rate  of growth.  Poor  protection  of
property  rights  and  transaction  costs-  associated  with  ths-
investment  process  have effects  on  growth  that  are-  similar  to
those  of an income  tax.6 The  same  is true  for the  inflation  tax
associated  with  monetary  expansion  (see  Easterly  et al (1990)  and
MIno (1990)).
ITe  Effects  of gS-torjl  DIstortIons
In less  developed  countries  comprehensive  forms  of taxation
are rarely  important. The tax collection  meehanism  is usually
primitive  and,  for this  reason,  certain  sectors  (e.g.  the  export
sector)  are  heavily  taxed  while  others  (e.g.  the  informal  sector)
escape  taxation. Dual  exchange  rate  systems,  tariffs  and Import
quotas  are  other  forms  of sectoral  distortions  commonly  found  In
developing  countries.  Easterly  (1990)  analyses  the  effects  of
these  distortions  within  an  extension  of the  linear  model.
In Easterly's  model  there  are two types  of capital  Zlt and
Z2tV both  o: which  are  composites  of physical  and human  capital.
Production  combines  two types  of capital  goods according to a
constant  returns  to  scale  function.  For  convenience  of
exposition  we  will  consider  the  special  case  in  which  this
function  is  Cobb-Douglas:
Y=  mA,'  Z'-M  (12)
t  it  2t
6North  (1987)  provides  an insightful  historical  discussion  of the
role  of  property  rights  in  the  growth  process  that  accords  with
the  implications  of  this  model.  Soto  (1989)  describes
transaction costs  that  are  commonly  associated with  the
Investment  process  In  less  ueveloped  countries.
9Both types  of capital  are accumulated  according  to (3).  The
resource  constraint  that  faces  the  private  sector  of this  economy
Is:
Yt  =Ct  Iit  (l+?I) I2t  (13)
where  Y  represents  an Investment  tax  on sector  1 or some other
type of  sectoral  distortion  such as  tariffs or  investment
licenses. The  real  Interest  rate  for  this  economy,  whicL  can  be
obtained  following  the  same  reasoning  used in the linear  model,
Is given by:
r  - p  A (I+ )-  8  (14)
where  9  is  a positive  fmnction  of  a.  It is  clear  that  this type
of sectoral  distortion  has  a detrimental  effect  on growth.  An
in^reaie  In vi  lowers  the real .,ate  of return  and the rate of
growth.
To  explore  the  impact  that  sectoral  distortions  can  have on
the  growth  process,  It Is  useful  to  compare  two  governments  that
seek to finance  public  expenditures  that represent  a  constant
share  of output  (we  describe  below  circumstances  in which It is
optimal to maintain  a constant  government  share).  The first
government  uses  income taxes while  the  second employs the
sectoral Investment  tax described above.  Figure 1,  which
compares  tho growth  rates  under  these two  policies  for various
value' of the  government  share In output,  shows clearly that
re..  ing  on the  sectoral  Investment  tax to raise,revenue  can  have
important  negative  effects  on the rate of growth.7  When the
share of  government  In output is 20%  the economy in which
expenditures  are financed  through  income  taxes  grows 1% faster
The  parameters  that  underlie  this  graph  are a-1/2,  6..  10,  r-1,
aN  o  1.014.  The  value  of  A  was  chosen  so that  the  after  tax  real
rate  of  return  is  3.2%  when the  rate  of Income  tax is 20%.  The
value  of P  was chosen  so that  the  rate  of  growth  is 2% per year
In  this  scenario.  See  King  and  Rebolo  (1990)  for  a  more  detailed
discussion  of these  parameter  values.
10than  theeconoiy  that  relies  on  sectoral  taxation.
hn&-21  gL  ovrMMent  Exveditures
In describing the effects of  taxation  we  assumed that
government  expenditures  enter  separately  in  the  utility  function.
Relaxing  the separability  assumption  Implicit  In (11) can have
important  Implications  for the  aetermination  of optimal tax  and
expenditure  policies  but Is not necessarily  relevant for the
relation  between  taxes  and  growth. To see this suppose  that  we
replace  the  momentary  utility  u(Ct)  +  O(Gt)  by a non-separable
function  v(CttGt).  To be consistent  with steady  state growth
this  function  must  have  the  form:
v(C.Gt)  a  *C  t  Gt  - I  e>O,  C>  (15) (Ct  t
where  e(i-@)  <  I  and  <(i-o)  <  o to  ensure  strict  concavity.
Suppose  that  the  government  follows  a balanced  budget  policy
by choosing  a combination  of income  tax rate r and government
expenditures  such that  Gt =  T  AZt.  In this case the rate of
growth  of this  economy  is,  Ignoring  the  corner  solution  with zero
Investment:
J.=  - {  C'  (A(1-T)  +  (1-8)1)  (16) N
If the government  does not maintain  a constant  share of
government  expenditures  1A  Income  this  economy  will  not  follow
a steady  state  path.  In this  case the effects  of taxation  are
harder  to characterize  but the  property  that  higher  taxes imply
lower  growth  is  generally  preserved.
Evidence for developing  countries suggests that certain
8The optimal  path for government  expenditure,  abetractlng  from
the  presence  of  distorting  taxes,  Is  such that  Ct/Gt  G.
11types  of  government  expenditures  may  play  an  Important  role  in
the  development  process.  The  existence  of  Infrastructures  such
as  roads  and  an  efficient  legal  system  are  often  viewed  as
important preconditions for economic development.  Barro  (1990)
has discussed these Issues in another extension of the  linear
model that  views public  expenditures  as having a p.oductive role:
the  production  function  has  the  form  Y  t  --  F(Zt#Gt).  For
simplicity  we will consider  the particular  case of a Cobb-Douglas
production  function:
t  A  Zt Gt  (17) t  t  t
Government  expenditures  are financed  by income taxation:  Gt
T  Yt,  so  the tax  rate T  coincides  with the government share in
output.  It Is easy to see that the marginal product of capital
for a given value of Tr  is  a  A(  T  '  The  rental price
of  capital will then be equal to Rt  =  (1-r) a A  T(1/
while the real Interest rate Is rt =  (1-T)  a A  (1/oa)  6.
The  rate  of  growth  of  this  economy  can  be  obtained  by
substituting  rt in  equation (8).
Unless all governments choose the optimal value of T  (which
is (1-a)) rates of growth will be different but the response of
growth to taxation Is now more complex:  the growth effect of a
marginal increase in T  is positive if  r <  (l-a)  and negative if
if  r  >  (1-X).
II.2  TRENDS IN  THE  RATE OF GROWTH
There  are  three  growth  paradigms  that  predict  that  If
preferences, technology  r4  public policy were  identical across
countries we should detect time trends in the rate of growth of
per capita output:  the neoclassical model. the Jones-Manuelll
(1990)  model and the  Romer (1986)  model.
The  neoclassical growth model predicts that poor countries
should  grow  faster  than  rich  countries  as  a  result  of
12transitional  dynamics.  poor  countries  have  a  lower  stock  of
capital  and  hence  a  higher  real  rate-  of  return  which  Induces  a
faster  rate  of  growth.  Using  a  battery  of versions  of the
neoclassical  growth  model,  King  and  Rebolo  (1989)  show  that  La
order  for  these  transitional  dynamics  to  be Important  the  real
rate,  of  interest  has  to  take  implausibly  high.  values  In  low
income-  countries.  For  instance,  in  order  for  transitional
dynamics  to  explain  the  Japanese  post-war  growth.  the  real
Interest  rate In Japan  in  the  end  of  World  War  It should  have
been  close  to  500%! These  implausible  predictions  about  the  real
rate of return  can be traced to the presence of decreasing
returns to scale to physical  capital.  When the production
function Is Cobb-Douglas  there Is a  simple expression that
relates  the value  of the real interest  rates in two countries
which  are identical  except  for  their  level  of  output:
r8  =  (rA  +  6)  (Y  /Y-)X/  6  (18)
In this expression  a represents  the labor  share and Y  A/Y0  the
ratio  of outputs  in the  two countries,  A  and B.  If we assume
that  o  - 2/3,  6  =  10 (which  are  standard  values  used In growth
accounting  studies,  see Maddison (1987)),  rA  =  6.5% and that
country  B has  half  of the  output  of country  A, we obtain  a value
for  r3 =  56%. This  is  an  extremely  implausible  value  in light  of
historical  evidence  on rates  of return  (see  Homer (1963),  Siegel
(1991).  and  Neal (1989)).  Lucas  (1990)  discusses  how  differences
in the levels  of human  capital  and capital  market  imperfections
can  moderate  these  rate  of return  Implications.  The effects  of
differences  in  human  capital can  be  explained using  the
production  function  proposed  by Mankiw,  Romer  and Weil (1990):
Y  =  AKHt"  "  "  where  H is human  capital  and L raw labor.
The relation  between  the  real Interest  rate  of two countries,  A
and  B is,  In this  case:
rB  =  (Y  /Y  )  (r  +  8) (H  /H )M2  6  (19) 13  A  A  B A
This  expression  shows  clearly  how  differences  In  the  levels  of
per  capital  human  capital  (HA and  Ha)  can  offset  the  tendency  for
13the  real  rate  of return  to  be low  in  poor  countries.
The Mankiw, Romer and Weil  (1990)  model preserves the
Implications  of the  neoclassical  model  that,  absent  differences
in  technology,  preferences  and  policy,  poor  countries  should  grow
faster  than  rich  countries.  The  same  Is  true  about  the
Jones-Manuelli  (1990)  model  which  relies  on  a  production  function
of  the  type:  Y  AZt  +  BZOT-x,  where  T  represents
non-reproducible  factors  such  as  land.  The  presence  of  T  In  the
production  function  implies  that  the  real  rate  of  return  Is  high
for  low  levels  of Z.
In  contrast  with  these  convergence  Implications,  the theory
proposed  by Romer C1986)  predicts  that  growth  should  accelerate
over time. This  prediction  is  based  on an Increasing  returns  to
scale  function  such  as  the  following:
Yt  = A Zt  lxT  ?t,  3l  ,  M3  >  0  (20)
t  t
al  +  M2  i
The factors  of production  in this economy  are Zt, which is a
composite  of physical  capital,  human capital and disembodied
knowledge,  and T, which represents  non-reproducible  factors of
production. The variable  Z  represents  the  per capita  capital
stock  in  the  economy. The  positive  effect  of  7t on production  Is
meant  to  capture  an  external  effect: the  accumulation  of capital
Increases  the stock  of knowledge  in the  economy  benefiting  all
production  units.9 This  externality  implies  that  the  competitive
equilibrium  is not Pareto  optimal  and  hence  there is scope for
government  intervention.
In the  borderline  case In which  al  +  oa - 1 this economy
displays  a behavior  that Is identical  to that of the  linear
model: there  are  .o transitional  dynamics  and  the  rate  of growth
is constant. If  a+&3>1 It Is  not feasible  for this  economy to
9See  Benhabib  and  Jovanovic  (1989)  and  Caballero  and  Lyons (1989)
for  attempts  to Isolate  empirically  this  type  of  externality.
14grow at a constant  rate  and  the  competitive  equilibrium  displays
In  general  growth  rates  that  accelerate.  10
11.3  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE
The  belief  that  international  trade  can be-  one of  the
driving  forces  of  economic  growth  is  shared  by  many  economists
and  policy  makers. The  model  developed  by  Romer  (1990a)  has  been
used by Grossman  and Helpman  (1989a.1989b)  and by Rivera-Batiz
and  Romer (1991)  to explore  the links  between  trade  and growth.
This model has  the advantage  of being consistent  with  the
observation that  profit  maximizing firms  Invest  In  R&D
activities.
To describe  the essential  features  of Romer's  model It Is
useful to  abstract  from population  growth and  to  view  all
variables  as representing  aggregate  quantities. The production
function  for the  output  sector  Is:
Yt  =  8 Lrt t  x(l)1"di  (21)
The variable  Lv denotes  the  number  of quality-adjusted  units of
labor employed In the production  of output.  A continuum of
capital  goods Indexed  by I e  (O  At  I  and represented  by x(l) Is
also employed  in production.I&  Each capital  good x(l) costs u
units of output  to produce  and does not depreciate  over time.
For  this  reason  the  aggregate  stock  of capital  In this  economy  is
Kt  K  VUAt x(i)  di.  To produce  capital  good i  It Is  necessary  to
0  .
Romer's  (1986) model does  not  have  the same  Implausible
Implications  for the time series  behavior  of the real rate of
return  as the neoclassical  model.  Suppose  for  instance  that
o=+oa  - 1.10.  In the  benchmark  case of King and Robelo (1989)
(which  involves  a real  rate  of return  of 6.5%  In the  beginning  of
the  century  and  a 6 fold Increase  output  from 1900 to 1980) tho
model  predicts  that  the  real interest  rate  should  have increased
from  6.S%  in 1900  to  9.7%  In 1980.
1lThe  assumption  that there  is a continuum  of capital  goods is
convenient  because  it  avoids  dealing  with  integer  constraints.
15have;  its  design,  that  is.  It  is  necessary  that 1 e (O  At].  New.
designs are produced  with labor according to  the followiag
technology:
At+i  =  (L-Ly)  At  +  At
where L Is the total  number  of available  efficiency  units of
time.
The market  for intermediate  products  is competitive  so the
rental  price  associated  with x(i) is equal  to the Its  marginal
product:
R(i)  =  (1-a)  B  La x(i)  (23)
The  inventor  of  a new  type  of  capital  has  perpetual  monopoly
power  in the  market  for  that  good  as a result  of a perfect  patent
system.  Assuming  that  the  economy  is at the  steady  state,  the
quantity  of each  capital  good  produced  is constant  and the  value
of an additional  patent  is:
PA  =-  v x(i) + (1+r)R(i)x(i)/r  (24)
where  r is the  real interest  rate,  vx(i) the  cost of production
of the capital  good (since  there  is no depreciation  production
takes  place  only once  along  the  steady  state  path)  and
(I+r)R(i)x(i)/r  the present  value  of revenue  from renting the
capital  good  to  firms  in  the  output  sector. Using  equations  (23)
and (24)  it is  easy to  see  that  the  rental  price  that  maximizes
patent  value is R(i) =  v r/[(l+r)(l-a)j  and that the optimal
quantity  of x(i) that  should  be  produced  is:  x(i)  - L ((-aM)  B
(l+r)/(rv)] 1".  The  value  of a  patent  is  equal  to:
PA=  4XVX(i)/(1-a)  (25)
The symmetric  role of the capital  goods In production  implies
that  In the  steady  state  x(i)  _ for  all  I  S  At.
16Profit  maximizing  in the  output  sector  and equilibrium  in
the  labor  market  ensure-  that:
w - a. B LM-x-  A  (26)
v
Slace  there  Is  free  entry  in  the  research  sector  the  value  of
a patent  has  to  be-  in  equilibriur-identical  to its  cost:
PA 8A/(l+r)  =  w  (27)
Using  equations  (25)-(27)  it is possible  to determine  the
quantity  of labor  employed  in the  output  sector  as being equal
to:  Ly  =  r/t(-a)61.  This,  in turn.  determines  the  "Innovation
rate":
7A  1  +  6L  - r/(l-m)  (28)
Along  the  steady  state  path  output  Is  given  by Yt =  B Ly x 1 At,
so Yt  grows  at  rate 
7A'  Output  is  used in  consumption  and in the
production  of new capital  goods:  Yt =  Ct +  v x (At+  - At).
Both  consumption  and  production  costs  grow  at rate  VA.  Equating
ic  n equation  (24)  to  7  A  In (28)  yields  the  equillbrium  value  of
the real Interest  rate and the  equilibrium  growth rate.  This
growth  rate  is  suboptimal  as a result  of the  presence  of  monopoly
pricing  In the intermediate  goods  market.  Since equation (S)
holds for this economy  the property  that higher real Interest
rates  lead  to higher  growth  is preserved. Equation  (28)  shows
that  there  is  a strong  scale  fictor  at work in this  model,  which
may  be  troublesome  in  the  presence of  population growth.
Integrating  two  economies  identical  to this  one  will increase  the
rate of growth,  since L would  double In the integrated  area.
Rivera-Batiz  and  Roner  (1991)  show  that  liberalizing  the  trade  of
goods  and of Ideas (represented  by At) has the same effects  as
economic  Integration.
The  effects of  tariffs and  other  trade barriers are
theoretically  ambiguous. In  models  similar  to the  one  described
Helpman  and  Grossman  (1989a)  show  that  tariffs  increase  the  rate
17of growth  while  Rivera-Batiz  (1989)  discusses  a case in which
they slow down economic  growth.  This variety  of theoretical
possibilities  is  not  surprising  given  the  presence  of increasing
returns  and monopolistic  competition.  It is well known that
second  best results  are more complex  and less Intuitive  than
their  first  best  counterparts.
II.4  POVERTY  TRAPS
A striking  feature  of the  growth  phenonmeon  in this  century
is that  a large  number  of  countries  have  failed  to Improve "tir
standard  of living.  Easterly (1991)  shows that the ra  '-  f
growth  of per  capita  GDP  Is  not  significantly  different  from  zero
in  46 out  of 87 developing  countries  included  in the  Summers  and
Heston (1988)  data set.  This evidence suggests that  some
countries  mav have been caught  in a "poverty  trap":  a  stable
steady  state  which  involves  stagnation  at low levels  of Income.
Models which display  poverty  traps  have been proposed In the
endogenous  growth literature  by Azariadis  and Drazen (1990),
Tamura  (1989),  and  Becker,  Murphy  and  Tamura  (1990).  12
The mechanism  at work in these models  can be explained
within a  stylized example inspired  by  Azariadis  and  Drazen
(1990). Consider  a Lucas-Uzawa  type  model  In  which  the  equations
that  pertain  to  output  production  and to the  accumulation  of the
capital  stock  are:
Yt = AKtc  (N  H)  O <  cc <1  (Z9)
t  t  tt(0
yt  =~  *  +It  (30)
7NKt1 =  It  +  (l-  )Kt  0 <  a  <1  (31)
The  production function for  human  capital takes  the
following  special  form:
12The  first  poverty  trap  model  was  proposed  by  Nelson  (1956). See
Neves (1990)  for  a through  discussion  and  critical  evaluation  of
poverty  trap  models.
18Ht+-  Bit-HNt)Ht  1 Ht  If  Ht>  (32)
Ht+  Ht  if  Ht<If
This  technology  implies  that  human  capital  can  only  be-
accumulated  once  the threshold  level  E  of  human  capital  is
reached.  It is clear  that  the  evolution  of the  economy  depends-
critically  on whether its level  of human capital is above or
below H.  When H  <  H  this economy is equivalent to  the
neoclassical  growth  model  without  technical  progress. There  can
be no sustained  growth  and  a steady  state  Is reached  whenever  a
AKtC H1-C+  (1-  d) =  71 /9, that  Is,  when the  real interest  rate
Is such that agents choose a  constant level of  per  capita
consumption.
If  Ht > H  the  economy  is  identical  to tne  one described  In
Lucas  (1988)  (abstracting  from  the  production externality
considered  by Lucas).  It  will converge  to a steady  state  where
it  will  grow  at rate  Ty  =  [$AT  (1+8)1  (1/0
The  human  capital  technology  described  in (32)  Is  an extreme
example  since  it Implies  that  economies  with  human  capital  below
H  cannot  accumulate  human  capital.  But it  captures  the  essential
idea explored  by Azariadis  and Drazen  (1990)  that economies  In
which human capital is low are less efficient  at accumulating
human  capital. This  generates  a  poverty  trap  In  which  the  steady
state  real  interest  rate  is  low  and  so is  the  growth  rate.
Tamura  (1989)  and  Becker,  Murphy  and  Tamura  (1990)  explore  a
similar mechanism that works through the endogeneity  of  the
fertillity  rate: since it is relatively  more costly for poor
families  to educate  their  children  they tend to have a larger
number  of  children  with  less  education  than  those  raised  by  rich
families.13  This  mechanism  means  that  countries  with low levels
13Erlich and Lui  (1989a,1989b)  explore the role of  lmplicit
familial  contracts  in economies  that have this type of poverty
trap.
19of hu2an capital  can converge  to a low-level  steady state in
which  there  Is  high  population  growth, no  human  capital
accumulation  and  no  growth  in  per  capita  output.
IIr.  EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE
The data that ls currently  available  to test the theories
described  in section  II are extremely  scarce.  There are some
estimates  of GDP. population,  exports,  Imports  and government
expenditures  for developed  countries  and for some developing
countries  (mostly  in Asia  and  Latin  America)  that  go back to the
19th  century (see Maddison (1982,1983)).  But,  for  most
countries,  the  data  that  is  available  covers  the  period  from 1950
to  the  present. For  this  reason  most  growth  studies  have  focused
on cross-country  regressions. These cross-country  regressions
are hard to interpret  because  most  of the  variables  considered
can  be viewed  as endogenous.  These  regressions  results  are also
affected  by  measurement  error  problems  and  lack  of robustness.
The  robustness  problem  has  been  examined  In  detail  by Levine
and Renelt (1990). These  two authors  show that virtually  all
policy  variables  (government  share  in  GDP.  proxies  for  property
rights protection,  measures  of trade intervention,  etc.) are
related  to  growth  but  that  the  signs  and  statistical  significance
of these  relations  depend  on the  other  variables  included  In the
right  hand side  of the  regression.  This is partly  a result  of
the  fact  that  policy  variables  are  highly  correlated: countries
that  pursue  highly  distorting  trade  policies,  also  tend  to employ
highly  distorting  tax  systems,  fail to guarantee  the protection
of property  rights,  etc.
In  an  exhaustive  study  that  uses  one  of Barro's  (1991)  basic
regression  equations  as point  of departure,  Levine and Renelt
(1990)  Identify  two  robust  statistical  relations: average  rates
of growth  are positively  related  to the share  of investment  In
GDP  and  the  latter  variable  is  positively  related  to the  share  of
trade In GDP.  Their  basic regression  equation,  which employs
20observations  for  101 countries  for  the period 1960-1989 is
(standard  errors  are  reported  in  parenthesis):
GYPm  -0.83- O.3SxRGDP60  - 0.38xGP0  +  3.17xSEC  +  17.SxINV  (33)
(0.85)  (0.14)  (0.22)  (1.29)  (2.68)
R  a  0.46
where  GYP is the  rate  of  growth  of per capita  GDP in the period
from  1960  to 1989,  RGDP60  Is  the  level  of  GDP in 1960,  GPO is  the
growth  rate of population.  SEC Is the enrollment  in secondary
education  In 1960,  and INV the investment  share in GDP.  This
regression  accords  with Barro's (1991)  finding that growth is
negatively  related  to  the  Initial  level  of per  capita  Income. 14
The investment  share  is clearly  the  most Important  variable
In the  regression  described  above. A regression  of the rate  of
growth  on the  investment  share  yields  the  following  results:
GYP =  -0.005 +  0.137xINV  (34)
2  (0.004)  (0.022)
R' =  30.6%
Below  we explore  one  way  of assessing  the  extent  to  which  we
can  explain  growth  as a  function  of the  investment  share  that  Is,
perhaps, more  revealing than lookirg at  the  R  from  this
regression.  This involves  computing  some model-implied  real
rates  of return  as a function  of the Investment  share  and the
growth  rate  of output.
Th  Shadow eal Rte  of  Return
The linear  model  described  in section  II implies  that there
should  be a simple  relation  between  growth. the real rate of
4This  result,  which  continues  to  hold If  we exclude  the  variable
INV from regression  (33),  might be  taken as  Indicating  the
presence  of cross-country  convergence. Barro  and Sala-i-Martin
(1989)  and  Quah (1990)  discuss  a  different  notion  of convergence
that  Involves a  decline over  time  in  the  cross-country
variability  of per  capita  income.
21return  and  .he  investment  share  in  GDP.  Defining  the  investment
share  as  It  =  It/(AZt),  the  equation  of evolution  for the  per
capita  stock  can  be  written  as:
VtNt  t+1  l  tAZ  t +(1  6)Z  t  (35)
It is easy  to see  that  the-  real  interest  rate  rt -A  - 6  can be
written  as a function  of the  investment  share  and  of the  rata  of
growth  of aggregate  output, tY  which, in this model always
coincides  with  the  growth  rate  of  capital.
t  NttYt  - (1-6)1/1t  - 6.  (36)
This  formula  Is almost  identical  to the  expression  for  one
of  the  key  indicators  used  in  practice to  evaluate the
performance  of programs  designed  to help developing  countries:
the  Incremental  Capital-Output  Ratio  (ICOR):
ICOR  = It/(Yt+1  - (t  =  t/3(7Ntt37)
where  YV represents  aggregate  output.
Equation  (36)  holds  for the  Easterly  (1990)  model  when the
economy Is  at  the steady state (in Easterly's  model  when
investment  Is reversible  the  transitional  dynamics  last  only for
one period).  It also holds for Barro's (1990)  model with a
slight modification (a represents  the  share of  capital In
production):15
rt=  MNttrYt  -1-5)]/i  - (38)
When 6=0, the ICOR is the Inverse  of the rate of return
described  in (36). Thus  the  linear  model  provides  a theoretical
foundation  for  an  Indicator  that has  a  long tradition in
Formulas  similar  to this one can also be obtained  for the
neoclassical  growth  model,  and for the  models  proposed  by Romer
(1986),  Lucas  (1988)  and  King  and  Rebelo  (1990).
22development  economics.  16
Figure  2  depicts  the  real  rates  of  retuurn  associated  with
the-linear  model.  These  were  computed  assumirg  that  B  - .10  and
using  growth rates for non-overlapping  10-year periodz and
average  Investment  rates  for  the  countries  in  the-World  Bank  data
set.  17 The  range  of  values  obtalned  Is  too  wide  to  be  believable,
demonstrating  the incomplete  nature  of our understanding  of  the
growth  phenomenon  on the  basis  of  rates  of  accumulation.
IV.  THE  ROLE  OF INTERNATIONAL  CAPITAL  MAPEKTS
All the  models  reviewed  in  section  II  explain  differences  in
rates of growth  as the result  of differences  in real rates of
return. But  in  order  for  these  differences  in rates  of return  to
survive  international  capital  markets  must  have  a primitive  form.
WLth perfect  capital  markets  rates  of return  would tend to be
equalized  across  countries  leading  to  uniform  growth  all  over  the
wol.18 world.18 The  only  exception  to  this  equalization  result  Involves
16The  Bruno and  Chenery (1962)  model can  also be  seen as
rationalizing  the  use  of the  ICOR. In  their  model  the  production
function  Is  Leontleff  and  there  is  a significant  fraction  of the
active population  tnat Is unemployed.  For this reason, the
production  function  can  be seen  as being  linear  up to the point
where  all active  population  becomes  employed. After  that point
the  economy  can  no longer  grow  and  hence  no longer  resembles  the
linear  model.
The  levels  of these  rates  of return  are  generally  very  high  when
compared  with the 6.5% average  real rate of return associated
with  common  stock  in the  US ln the  1928-1988  period  (see  Ibbotson
and  Sinquefield  (1988)),  or even  to the  30% return  on equipment
Investment  estimated  by De Long and Summers (1991).  This Is
partly  a result  of the  narrow  concept  of Investment  used which
excluded,  among  other  things,  Investment  In  education.
This is  the  reason  why  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1989a),  who assume
23the  case  of taxation  under  a worldwide  syste-  considered  by Klng
and  Rebelo  (1990)  and  Rebelo  (1991)  and  further  examined  below.  19
To describe  the impact  that international  capital  markets
can have let us return  to the linear  model of section II and
consider  a country  in  whi.ch  the  real  rate  of return  Is  r - A(1-c)
- a  as a result  of transactions  costs represented  by c.  In
developed  countries  these  transaction  costs  do not  exist  and the
real rate of return  Is r  - A - 6.  What would happen if  the
private sector were allowed to  invest In  the  international
.
capital  market  at rate  r  ?  In the  extreme  case in %hich there
are  no  lrreversibilities  or adjustment  costs  associated  with  the
canital  Installed,  production  in  the  LDC  would  be driven  to  zero
and  all  capital  would  be  moved  abroad. GDP  would  be zero  but  GNP
and  consumption  would  grow  at the  same  rate  as in the  developed
world.
This represents  a solution  to the  development  problem  that
In  our  view is  markedly  utopian. It  suggests  that  the  World  Bank
should  be setting  up mutual  funds  in developing  countries  that
allow  their  population  to Invest  their  savings  In the  developed
world.  This  simple, costless policy would  lead  to  an
equalization  of the  growth  rate  of  GNP and  of consumption.  Below
we  discuss some modifications  of  this scenario that might
mitigate  the  growth  equalization  implication.
More  comolex  forms  of  production  and  accumulation
The first  modification  has to  do with the  reversibility  of
Investment.  If investment  were Irreversible  all new Investment
the  presence of  international  capital markets,  focus  on
explaining  the  world  growth  rate.  instead  of  cross-country
differences  in  rates  of  expansion.
19The  effects  of  liberalization  of  international  capital  markets
are  particularly  dramatic  in  models  with Increasing  returns,  see
Correia  (1990).
24would  take  place  abroad  and  per  capita  GDP  would  tend  to  decline.
In this  case liberalizing  capital  markets  leads to high growth
rates  in per capita  GNP  which  quickly  decline  toward  the  growth
rate  of  developed  countries. 20
Introducing  sectors  that  use  factors  of  production  that
cannot  be  moved  abroad  (c.g.  land  and  labor)  elimLnates  thet.
prediction  that  GDP would  embark  on  a  declining  path  after  the
opening  of international  capital  markets. Consider  for instance
the  poverty  trap  model  of  section  II.4.  If an economy  that  has
Ht<H  and is  at the  low  level  steady  state  could  obtain  a rate  of
return  r  on Its  investments  it  would  produce  domestically  until
the  point where the  domestic  real interest  rate coincides  with
r:  rt=  AK t  H  - 8  = r.  In this case GDP would be
constant  and  domestic  Investment would  only  compensate
depreciated  capital.
Models with Immobile  factors  can be used to show  that
liberalizing  capital flows may have  Important  redistribution
effects. The  owners  of the  immobile  factors  may  become  worst  off
as a consequence  of financial  liberalization  due to decline in
the  level  of  domestic  capital.
In a model In  which  the  accumulation  of physical  and human
capital  are treated  separately,  such  as the  one in Luc  .s (1988)
and in  King  and  Rebelo  (1990)  the  effects  of a liberalization  of
capital  flows  are more complex  tlan In the linear  model.  But
they  also  Involve  a  decline  in  the  rate  of  domestic  investment  in
favor  of Investment  in the  international  capital  markets.
k2n-Tradable  Goods
Introducing  non-tradable  goods  does not  generally  eliminate
the growth-equalization  result.  This can be  Illustrated  by
20The higher the rate of depreciation  of the domestic  capital
stock  the  higher  the  growth  rate in the initial  period  and the
faster  the  convergence  to  the  world  growth  rate.
25modifying the  linear  model of  section 'I.1 to  assume that
consumption  is a non-tradable  which Is produced  with land and
capital: 21
Ct =  B Z(a TI-&  t39)
Capital  is  tradableo  and,  before  opening  capital  markets,  it
is produced according  to a  linear production function  with
productivity  A(1-c)  and accumulated  according  to (3).  Before
liberalizing  capital  flows  this  economy's  real  GNP, measured  In
units,of  the  tradable  good,  grows  at the  rate:
CGNP  3  7N  v1 1r)I  a1 -r10  (40) GNP  m~~
where  r =  A(1-0)  - d.  Once liberalization  Is accomplished  the
new growth rate of GNP is given by expression (40) with r
replaced  by r, that  Is, the  growth  equalization  result  obtains
despite  consumption  being  a non-tradable.  This  result,  suggested
by this example,  holds  generally  as long as the non-tradable
goods  are  produced  with  tradables.  When this  is  not the  case  It
is  possible  to  have  two  countries  with  different  GNP  growth  rates
despite  the  presence  of integrated  capital  markets. One  example
of this  type  Is  discussed  in  Buiter  and  Ketzler  (1991). In  their
model  human capital is  produced with a  non-traded input
(inherited  human  capital)  which  cannot  be  used In  production.
The  Lrol1  g  uncertalnty
The  consideration  of  uncertainty  can  also  potentially
influence  the  growth  equalization  result.  Households  In LDC's
might  not  be  willing  to  bear  the  risks  associated  with investment
In  the developed world.  But  the  evidence points to  the
conclusion  that investment  In LDC's Is much riskier than in
developed  countries  even  when we disregard  the possibility  of
21This  model  is  described  in  more  detail  In  Rebelo  (1991).
26confiscation  of  private  assets  by  the  government.
The  data  available  for  the  "emerging  stock  markets"  in  LDC's
indicates  that the  variance  of  returns  to  their  stock  market
indexes is much higher  than  the  variance  of  returns  to  the
Standard  & Poors  500  Index.  But  since  average  returns  in  LCD's
have  also  been  generally  higher  than-  average  returns  to  the  S&P
500, nothing  can be concluded  from  this  observation  unless  we
have  a model  that  allows  us to  price  risk.22
If we use the variance  of real GDP to measure the risk
associated  with investment,  we conclude  that  this risk is higher
In  LDC's: in  the  Summers  and  Heston  (1988)  data  set  the  variance
of real  GDP for  the 1/3  poorest  countries  Is twice  the  variance
of the 1/3 richest  countries  (.0033  versus  .0016) (see Renelt
(1991)).
It Is  worthwhile  noting  that  the  presence  of political  risk
cannot  eliminate  the  growth  equalization  result  because  the  flows
of capital  that  are being  discussed  go from  LDC's to developed
countries,  not  the  other  way  arounc.
Theoretically  the influence  of uncertainty  on growth Is
ambiguous.  As Is clear from Levhari  and Srinivasan's  (1969)
classical  paper on savings under uncertainty,  whether a  mean
preserving  spread Increases  or decreases  the rate of  growth
depends  on whether  a  is greater  or smaller  than  one.  Assuming
that  log(lrt) is i.i.d.  and follows  a normal  distribution  with
mean  g  and variance  v2,  the growth  rate  X  -e  linear  economy
discussed  in  section  II.1  is:
2The  data collected  by the International  Finance Corporation
(1990) shows  that during  the period  1984-89 the  standard
deviation  of returns  to  the  S&P  500  was  5.  12X,  while  the  standard
deviation  associated  with the returns  to a composite  index of
stock  in  developing  countries  was  7.06X  The  variance  of returns
for  every  single  country  included  in  the index  was  higher than
that  of  the  S&P  500.
27(is7 rn-V  )(1/0)  (1+rt)  exp  { tp(l-r)  +  (U.r)  2aW  ./f.*}  (41)
The  mean  growth  rate  is  given  by  a  simpler  expression  which
shows  clearly  that  a  mean  preserving  spread  (an  Increase  In  the
vartance  term  v2 together  with  an  adjustment  in  p  that  keeps
E(14r  t) constant)  decreases  the  mean  growth  rate  if  a  <  I  and
increases  it  when  o-  >1.
E(Mt)  t  R  7  ,  E(i+r  )  I  ()  exp  [(va/2)  (o-1)l  (42)
As one would  expect,  the variance  of the rate of growth,
which  is  given  by:
var(vt)  =  (E(1+rt)  1l 7 Q]t  MM  exp (rv 2) El  - exp(-v 2)1  (43)
t  t  ~~~~N
always  increases  with  a mean  preserving  spread.
ne taxation  of foreign  investment
Whether tax-driven  differences  in rates of  growth can
survive  In the  presence  of international  capital  markets  depends
on how income  from  foreign  investment  is  taxed.
There  are  essentially  two  systems regarding the  tax
treatment  of foreign  investment: the  worldwide  system  and the
territorial  system. Under  the  worldwide  tax  system  an investor
pays  domestic taxes on  Income  from  foreign Investment  but
receives  credit  for any taxes  paid abroad  on the same Income.
Since this credit  cannot  exceed  the amount  of domestic taxes
associated  with  foreign  income,  the  relevant  tax rate Is In this
*  0
case maxUr,  ), where  T  is the foreign  tax rate.  Under the
territorial  system  foreign  income  is exempted  from taxation. 23
23This discussion  ignores  other relevant  features  of  the tax
system  such as the  role  of transfer  prices,  the possibility  of
tax  deferral,  and  the  existence  of  a tax  credit  by country  versus
an  overall  tax  credit. See  Slemrod  (1988)  and  Swenson  (1989)  for
more detailed discussions  of  the  tax  treatment of  foreign
28The  worldwide  system  is  used  by the  US,  the  UK,  Japan  and  Canada.
while the territorial  system  is followed  by France  and by the
Netherlands.
It is easy to see that  under  the  worldwide  system  taxation
can  still  generate  different  rates  of growth  in the  presence  of
lnternational  capital  markets.  If v  >T  no foreign Investment
will be undertaken. If  tr  sT  there is still  no reason  to move
Investment  abroad  since  the  relevant  tax  rate  continues  to be r.
For this reason  the  effects  of taxation  are the same as In a
closed  economy.  24
Under the  territorial  system  an increase  in domestic  taxes
0
rate above r  has the  dramatic  Implications  already  discussed:
all  new investment  Is  undertaken  abroad.
In summary, with  the exception of  taxation under  the
worldwide  system,  the  mechanisms  described  In section  II do not
survive  as sources  of growth  differentials  in the presence  of
international  capital  markets. These  mechanisms  can  nevertheless
be important  to explain  differences  in rates  of growth across
historical  periods.  Goodfriend  and  McDermott (1990) Is an
example  of  a model  that  can  be  viewed  as explaining  how the  world
as a whole  moves  from primitive  forms  of production  to modern,
specializatior-based,  forms  of  organization.
V.  SAVINGS  AND  GROWTH
In the  absence  of international  capital  markets  differences
in  real  rates  of return  that  reflect  aspects  of the  technology  or
of government  policy translate  into differences  In rates of
lnvestment.
240ne  problem  with  the  worldwide  system  is  that  it Is  only  optimal
under very restrictive  assumptions; see Feldstein  and Hartman
(1979).
29growth.  In  the  opposite  polar  case  of  perfect  International
capital  markets  the  real  rate  of  return  Is  the  same  all  over  the
world  and.  as  a  consequence,  technology  and  government  policy
cannot  Influence  the  rate  of  growth  of  consumption  and  have
generally  a  small  impact  on  the  rate  of  expansion  of  GNP.
This  section  considers  a  simple  extension  of  the  standard
preference  specification  that is consistent  with differences  in
rates of  growth  with perfect international  capital markets.
These  preferences  have the  time-separable  form described  in (5)
but  have  a  different  momentary  utility  function:
u(Ct)  (44)
The  only  difference  between  this  Stone-Geary  function  and the  one
described  (6)  involves  the  consumption  subsistence  term  C.  With
this  utility  function  the  elasticity  of  intertemporal
substitution,  which  is (1-C/C  t)(1/). is no longer  constant:  It
Is equal to zero when C  =  C  and converges to  (1/o) when t  -
consumption  grows  at  a sustained  rate.2
Before  we discuss  the  role  of International  capital  markets
it is  useful  to  describe  the  competitive  equilibrium  for  a closed
economy  when  the  technology  is  linear  and  the  government  levies  a
proportional  tax  on income  as in  section  II.1.  In this  case,  it
is possible  to solve  the  model  in closed  form.  Given the level
of  per  capita  capital  stock.  Zt'  the  optimal  level  of consumption
associated  with  these  preferences  is  given  by:
t  a [Zt  -I+  C,  (45)
25King and  Rebelo  (1989)  discuss  the transitional  dynamics  of a
version  of the neoclassical  model that has these preferences.
Christiano  (1989)  uses a  neoclassical  model with Stone-Geary
preferences  In which a  trend is introduced in  subsistence
consumption  to interpret  the growth  of Japan In the post-war
period.
30In  this  expression  C  s  Q/(1+r-v)  is the  minimum  level  of capital
that  can  support  the  subsistence  level  of consumption. The real
interest  rate Is given  by rt a  A(1-)  - 6.  The constant  a is
equal to a =  (i+r)  - E' y"  (ler))]"  . The  optimal
rate  of savings  Is  given  by the  following  hyperbola:
St  - (r  - a)/r  +  (a3  - g)/(rZt)  (46)
The rate of savings  converges  to (TN-l)/r  when the  level of
capital  approaches  g.  When  1cr  > 71 /1,  the  country  pursues
N
unbounded  growth.  When l+r <  1 /  I  It converges  toward the
N
subsistence  level  Z.
To have  a better  feel  for  the  implications  of this  model  it
is  useful  to look  at two  examples.  The  first.  depicted  in  Figure
3, pertains  to  country  A  where  the  private  rate  of return  is low,
for  one of the  reasons  suggested  in section  II, so that  I+r  <
g  /O.  The  level  of income  in  this  economy  converges  toward  the
subsistence  level.
Suppose  that  agents  in this  country  are  allowed  to invest  in
the  developed  world  and  that  currently  the  level  of Income  in  the
economy  is twice  the  subsistence  income  level.  As we have seen
in section III, if C were zero the  growth  rate would suddenly
Increase  to the  same level  as that  of the  developed  world.  But
since  C > 0 and the economy is close to subsistence consumption.
there  is a very long  period  of  slow  growth. The  reason  for this
is  that  locally around the  subsistence  steady  state  the
elasticity  of Intertemporal  substitution  is close to zero.  As
consumption  increases  so does the elasticity  of  lntertemporal
substitution, eventually converging to  1/o,  and  leading
households to  choose steeper paths  for  their  consumption
profiles.
Figure 4 shows that the pattern  of evolution  that would
follow a  liberalization  of financial  flows.  This transition
process  can be extremely  slow,  It can take  a long time for the
economy  to grow at a "healthy  rate"  and the  brush  with poverty
31will leave permanent  scars:  there is no  tendency  for  this
country  to catch  up with  the level  of Income  of the  rest  of the
world.
After  the  liberalization  of capital  flows  all  new investment
is  undertaken  abroad  but  Initially  these  flows  are  very  small  and
the  effects  on  growth  almost  negligible.  One  way to  see  that  the-
short  term  effec1.s  of financial  liberalization  are likely  to be
disappointing  is to  look  at the  relation  between  the  savings  rate
and the  rate  of growth  associated  with  equation  (4):  Ty  (s  r +
1 )/T.  When the  level  of consumption  is elose  to C  the  response
of savings  to  changes  In  r is  very  small  and  s is close  to zero.
As a consequence,  eliminating  internal  distortions  or allowing
investment  abroad  to raise r will have almost  no short term
impact  on the  rate  of  growth.
The  idea  that  poor  countries  have  lower  savings  rates  is  not
new.  It was one of the empirical  regularities  discovered  by
Kuznets (1966,  pp. 426-7)  ano it is a prominent  feature  of the
famous Kaldor (1956)  model.  This idea is, however, often
associated  with  the  time-honored  question  concerning  the  relation
between  the  Income  distribution  and  growth. In  the  Kaldor  (1956)
model  there  are  two  groups  of agents  that  have  different  marginal
savings  rates. Thus,  redistributing  Income  raises  the  aggregate
savings  rate  and  the  rate  of growth. The  Stone-Geary  preferences
described in  (44) do not Imply any  relation  between Income
distribution  and  the  rate  of  growth.26  The  reason  for  this  is  that
the  consumption  decision rule (45) Is  linear Implying that
although  different  agents  have  different  average  savings  rates,
they  all  have  the  same  marginal  rate  of savings.
There  are several  sources  of evidence  consistent  with the
Idea that  poor countries  have lower  savings  rates.  Glovannini
(1985)  has  estimated  the  elasticity of  intertemporal
substitution  in  LDC's  is  extremely  low  and  often  insignificantly
26See Williamson  (1989,  Lecture  3) for an historical  discussion
that  supports  the  idea  that  Inequality  and  growth  are  unrelated.
32different  from  zero.  This  is  exactly  what  one  would  expect  from
our  Stone-Geary  formulation.  Recall  that  the  elasticity  of
intertemporal  substitution is  equal  to  (1--C/Ct)(1/W).  so
countries  with consumption  levels  close  to C  should  be expected
to  have  low  values  for  the  rate  of  intertemporal  substitution. 27
Atkeson and Ogaki  (1991)  show  that  two  types  of  utility
functions  rationalize  simultaneously  the fact that rich people
have  higher  savings  rates  and  lower  food  expenditure  shares  than
poor  people: a two-good  extension  of (44)  and  a 2-good  addilog
utility  function  They  discuss  a large  tody of evidence  that
supports both of  these empirical regularities  and  describe
simulations  in  which  their  models  reproduce  the  S-shaped  pattern
of savings  as a function  of income  suggested  by  Kuznets.  They
also prove  aggregation  results  for these  utility  functions  thu.t
guarantee that  the  relevant elasticity parameters can  be
estimated  using  aggregate  data.  In  a separate  paper (Ogak.i  and
Atkeson  (1991))  they  report  estimation  results  focusing  only the
addilog  utility  function. This  narrower  focus is justlfiei  by
the  fact  that  their  2-good extension of  (44)  has  the
counterfactual  implication  that  the  elasticity  of the  demand  for
food  Is  highest  for  poor  people.
Figure 5 shows the relation  between the share of gross
domestic  savings  in GNP and the level  of real per capita  GNP.
270ne possible  problem  with  Glovannini's  estimates  is that they
rely  on data  for  the  real  return  to time  deposits. It is  un:lear
whether  these  real  rates  of  return,  which  are  often  negative,  are
a good measure  of the  real  rate  of return  to capital  In LDCq'.
In developing  countries  the financial Intermediary  system is
often  primitive and  retained  earning are  used  to  finance
Investment  projects  whose  rates  of return  are much higher than
the  time  deposit  rate. The  fact  that  the  change  in  time-deposits
as  a fraction  of  savings  is  small  can  be  seen  as  suggesting  that
direct financing of  investment  is,  In  fact,  an  Important
phenomenon  In LDC's. Gelb (1989)  reports  that the  change  in M3
(which  includes  currency  plus deposits)  on savings  during the
period 1965-73  was  18.7%  for countries  with a  positive real
Interest  rate, 12.7%  for  countries  that  had  small  negative  real
Interest  rates  and 6.4X for countries  that had large negative
real  interest  rates.
33Each point corresponds  to the average  savings  rate and Income
level for  a  given  country during a  10-year period  (only
non-overlapping  perioda  were used;  the Figure has  the same
features  If  we take  averages  over  a different  time  horizon). The
solid  line in  this Flgure corresponds  an  estimate of  the
hyperbola  described  in (46). Figure  6  presents  the  same  evidence
but  concentrating  on countries  with incomes  less  than 15000  1987
US dollars. The  dotted  line in  Figure  7 depicts  an estimate  of
(46) while the solid line was constructed  by  ordering the
countries  by income,  dividing  them  into  10  classes  and computing
the  simple  average  of the  savings  rate  for  these  various  classes.
This  set  of  Figures  shows  a relation  between  the  rate  of savings
and  the  level of  Income that accords remarkably  with  the
predictions  of  equation  (46).
Table  1 shows  that  the  relation  between  the inverse  of the
level  of Income  and the  rate of savings  holds  up when we move
from  a bivariate  comparison  to  a  multivariate  analysis. The  data
used in these regression  is that of the Barro-Wolf  data set
extended  to include  World  Bank  measures  of the  savings  rate and
of the share  of exports  In GDP.  Standard  errors,  reported  in
parenthesis,  are  based  on  White's  (1980)
heteroskedasticity-consistent  covariance matrix.  The  first
regression  describes  the  relation  between  the savings  rate and
the inverse  of the  level  of income  1960 (INVGDP60),  depicted  in
Figures S  through 7.  The  second regression includes the
variables in  the Barro-Wolf  data  set  that are  not  highly
correlated  with the initial  income  level.  These variables  are
the share  of government  consumption  expenditures  in GDP  (GOV),
number  of revolutions  per  year (REVOL),  number  of assassinations
per  million  population  per  year (ASSASS)  and  the  magnitude  of the
deviation  of the Investment  deflator  from the sample average
(PPI60DEV).  In this regression  the coefficient  on  INVGDP60
continues  to be negative  and  significant.  The  same result  holds
when  we  Include,  in  the  third  regression,  the  share  of  exports  In
GDP  (XGDP)  . The  motivation  to  Include  this  variable  is  Levine
and  Renelt's  (1990)  finding  that  this  is the  only  variable  that
34is  robustly  correlated  with  lnvestment.28  Regressions  (6)  and (7)
on Table  2  Include  the  variables  of the  Barro-Wolf  data set  that
are  highly  correlated  with  the  initial  level  of income-  ('able  2):
the  enrollment  ratios  for  primary  and  secondary  education  in 1960
(PR1IH60  and SEC60, respectively)  and the dumy  variables  for-
Africa  and  Latin  America. Not  surprisingly  all the  variables  in
the regression  become  Insignificant,  with the exception  of the
export  share,  as a result  of multicolinearity.  In  contrast  with
what one might expect  on the basis  of life-cycle  theories  of
savings, population-related  variables (the growth  rate  of
population,  measures  of the  age structure,  mortality  rates)  are
insignificant  when included  in  regression  (3).
Table  3 reports  similar  results  for  a set of regressions  in
which  the  share  of investment  Is  used  as a proxy  for the savings
rate.  These  regressions  are  presented  to show that the results
that  we reported  are  not  likely  to  be an artifact  of measurement
error  in the  savings  rate  series.
VI.  CONCLUSION
The new  growth  literature  has Identified  several  mechanisms
which can potentially  explain  differences  In rates of growth
across  countries.  Unfortunately  most  of these  mechanisms  fall to
generate different rates of  expansion in  the  presence of
International  capital  markets. Existing  models  predict that a
libe-alization  of capital  flows  would be followed  by "capital
flight"  from stagnated  countries,  where the rate of return  Is
low,  to  fast  growing  countries.  As  a result,  the  growth  rates  of
consumption  and  of GNP  would  be  equalized  around  the  world.
A significant  part of the  new growth literature  has been
28Romer (1990b)  reports  results  similar  to  those  of this  equation
for the investment  share. He found  that  per capita  real Income
In 1960 is the  only  variable  that  has explanatory  power for the
Investment  share after  one controls  for the influence  of the
share  of exports  in  GDP.
35devoted  to studying  alternative  specifications  of the  technology
that  makes  sustained  growth  feasible  without  exogenous  technical
progress. The thought  experiment  of liberalizing  capital  flows
suggests that  properties of  the  technology alone  cannot
rat.onalize  the  diversity  of growth  experiences  that  we observe.
When  we  combine  those  properties  with  the  standard
time-separable,  lsoelastic  preferences  we obtain  the implication
that allowing  stagnant  countries  to Invest their savings In
growing economies  would solve the development  problem.  This
suggests  that  the  standard  preference  specification  Is inadequate
to think  about  growth  in  open  economies.
This paper explored  perhaps  the simplest  modification  of
standard  preferences  that  has two  properties: It is consistent
with  evidence  that  poor  countries  save less  than rich countries
and Implies  that  a  liberalization  of capital  flows would have
negligible  short  term  effects  on the  rate  of growth.  Empirical
and  theoretical work  that  Improves on  this  preference
specification can  potentially enhance  significantly  our
understanding  of  the development  problem.  29  An  important
by-product  of this research  might be the solution  to another
classical  problem  in  development  economics: the  relation  between
the  dynamics  of lncome  distribution  and the  growth  process.
29Allen (1989)  and  Zervos  (1991)  are  examples  of studies  of the
consequences  of departures  from standard  preferences  for  the
implications  of  growth  models.
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43Table  1
Savings  Rate  Regressions
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
CONSTANT  0.240  0.310  0.278  0.128  0.132
(0.017)  (0.OS0)  (0.061)  (0.072)  (0.078)
INVGDP60  -0.050  -0.419  -0.039  -0.019  -0.018
(0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.020)
GOV  -0.377  -0.397  -0.230  -0.224
(0.311)  (0.300)  (0.302)  (0.296)
ASSASS  -0.011  -0.006  -0.008  -0.009
(0.022)  (0.024)  (0.018)  (0.019)
REVOL  -0.075  -0.046  -0.011  -0.012
(0.097)  (0.096)  (0.093)  (0.093)
PPI60DEV  0.006  0.007  0.004  0.006
(0.035)  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.033;
XGDP  0.098  0.072  0.074
(0.068)  (0.073)  (0.079)
SEC60  -0.042  -0.046
(0.092)  (0.130)




LAAME  -0.  001
(0.060)
R2  0.14  0.17  0.19  0.24  0.24
44Table  2











Investment  Rate  Regressions
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
CONSTANT  0.234  0.229  0.206  0.070  0.074
(0.010)  (0.019)  (0.024)  (O..031)  (0.036)
INVGDP60  -0.041  -0.034  -0.034  -0.004  -0.009
(0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)
GOV  0.107  0.073  0.137  0.122
(0.099)  (0.102)  (0.093)  (0.092)
ASSASS  -0.007  -0.005  -0.007  -O.  003
(0.014)  (0.01S)  (0.010)  (0.010)
REVOL  -0.  125  -0.090  -0.027  -0.024
(0.021)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.027)
PPI60DEV  -0.049  -0.048  -O.059  -0.062
(0.018)  (0.088)  (0.015)  (0.015)
XGDP  0.088  0.092  0.085
(0.023)  (0.020)  (0.018)
SEC60  0.125  0.115
(0.044)  (0.047)






R2  0.29  0.47  0.49  0.63  0.64
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